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IGNORANCE AND PROCEDURAL LAW REFORM: 
A CALL FOR A MORATORIUM 
Stephen B. Burbank' 
In 1881, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. observed that 
"(i]gnorance is the best of law reformers. People are glad to 
discuss a question on general principles, when they have 
forgotten the special knowledge necessary for technical 
reasoning."1 In 1982, I concluded a study of the Rules 
Enabling Act of 19342 with a question for federal rulemakers, 
namely, whether "ignorance can continue to be 'the best of law 
reformers."'3 My question was prompted by the studied 
indifference of those responsible for the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to questions of rulemaking power. In the 
intervening decade, I also have had occasion to lament their 
studied indifference to empirical questions.4 The two 
phenomena are related. The papers for this session provide a 
welcome occasion to explore that relationship, however briefly. 
I want to suggest that by failing to take seriously the task 
of defining limitations on the rulemaking power, the Supreme 
Court and those who assist it have encouraged Congress also 
to ignore the question of appropriate allocation rules. 
Similarly, by failing to seek empirical evidence on the 
operation of the Rules or proposed amendments, the 
rulemakers have both put their workproduct at risk of 
· Robert G. Fuller, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School. This article is a revised version of remarks made at the Symposium. I 
have profited from discussions with Leo Levin and Richard Marcus. 
1 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 64 (Mark DeWolfe Howe 
ed., 1963). 
2 Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064. The current version 
of the Enabling Act is contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-74 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1988) (bankruptcy rules). 
3 Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1015, 1197 (1982) (footnote omitted). 
4 See, e. g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil 
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1927-28, 1934-41, 
1957-59 (1989). 
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legislative override and encouraged Congress to initiate its 
own half-baked reforms. We need a moratorium on procedural · l 
law reform, whether by court rule or by statute, until such 
time as we know what we are doing. The knowledge needed 
concerns alternative reform strategies and their likely impacts, 
but we also need to know who is responsible for what. 
If this sounds like crisis rhetoric, which Professor Marcus 
correctly suggests can be overblown, self-serving or both,5 so 
be it. It is difficult, however, not to sense a crisis in federal 
procedural reform when the Chief Justice's letter transmitting 
the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules disclaimed any 
implication "that the Court itself would have proposed these 
amendments in the form submitted,''6 and when four other 
Justices indicated their agnosticism about,7 lack of competence 
to evaluate8 or disagreement with,9 one or more of the 
amendments. When a majority of the Supreme Court has 
washed its hands of proposed Federal Rules, and when some of 
the Justices have aired the dirty linen, what is it that should 
restrain Congress from responding to those who wish to do the 
same? 
It cannot be Congress' confidence that those who draft the 
Rules are alert to the limitations on the rulemaking power 
contained in the Enabling Act. Ignorance on that score has 
persisted despite a serious effort to invigorate and clarify the 
desired scheme of allocation in the legislative history of the 
1988 overhaul of the Enabling Act.10 To be sure, there has 
5 See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for 
Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761 (1993). 
6 H.R Doc. No. 74, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993) (letter from William H. 
Rehnquist to Thomas S. Foley (April 22, 1993)), reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) 
477 (1993). 
7 See H.R Doc. No. 74, supra note 6, at 102 (statement of Justice White), 
reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 575. 
8 See H.R Doc. No. 74, supra note 6, at 101-02, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. 
(Preface) at 581. 
9 See H.R Doc. No. 74, supra note 6, at 104 (dissenting statement of Justice 
Scalia), reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 581. Justice Scalia dissented from the 
Court's adoption of amendments to Rule 11 (sanctions) and to Rules 26, 30, 31, 33 
and 37 (discovery). Justice Thomas joined in full, while Justice Souter joined in 
the dissent with respect to the discovery rules. 
10 See H.R REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985); Stephen B. Burbank, 
Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's "Substance" and "Procedure" in 
the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1029-36; Karen Nelson Moore, The 
Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 
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been progress, including one Reporter's acknowledgement that 
separation of powers is an Enabling Act concern, 11 the 
Supreme Court's willingness, for the first time since Sibbach v. 
Wilson & Co.,12 to take at least somewhat seriously an 
Enabling Act challenge to a Federal Rule (Rule 11)/3 the 
Court's refusal to transmit proposed amendments because of 
foreign refations concerns14 and the acknowledgement by the 
Advisory Committee that one of its proposals may transgress 
the Enabling Act's limitations.15 There is still no consensus 
among the rulemakers, however, about the nature and scope of 
the limitations on their power. In the absence of consensus, the 
Advisory Committee is apt to equate controversy with politics, 
which is for Congress, 16 and the statement of controversial 
issues that the Supreme Court now expects to receive with 
rulemaking proposals17 is apt to tempt Justices to "discuss a 
HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1043-53 (1993). 
11 See Burbank, supra note 10, at 1015, 1017 n.31, 1018-19; Paul D. 
Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 281, 298. 
12 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
13 See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Comm'n Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. 533 
(1993). But see Ralph U. Whitten, Developments in the Erie Doctrine: 1991, 40 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 967, 967-70 (1992). "It remains true that the Court has never 
invalidated a rule promulgated under the Act." Id. at 970. 
14 See H.R . Doc. No. 77, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991) (letter from William 
H. Rehnquist to Thomas S. Foley (April 30, 1991)); Letter from William K. Suter, 
Clerk of the Supreme Court, to L. Ralph Mecham, Secretary of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States (Dec. 11, 1991) (returning proposed amendments 
to Rules 4, 4.1, 12, 26, 28, 30, and 71A and enclosing documents presenting 
foreign relations concerns). 
15 The Advisory Committee Note to the 1993 amendments to Rule 4 is prefaced 
by a "Special Note" as follows: "Mindful of the constraints of the Rules Enabling 
Act, the Committee calls the attention of the Supreme Court and Congress to the 
new subdivision (k)(2). Should this limited extension of service be disapproved, the 
Committee nevertheless recommends adoption of the balance of the rule . . . .  " 
H.R. Doc. No. 74, supra note 6, at 154-55, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 
631. 
16 See Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of 
Committee Meeting 4-5 (April 13-15, 1992) [hereinafter April 1992 Minutes]. 
"Unless there is consensus about the limits of the rulemaking function, however, it 
is doubtful that all the procedural safeguards in the world will prevent controversy 
where it counts-in Congress-because the rulemakers' reaction to controversy in 
the lawmaking process will necessarily continue to be ad hoc." Burbank, supra 
note 3, at 1195. 
17 The Advisory Committee was informed in February 1992 "that the Court 
would in the future like a memorandum explaining the contentious issues 
resolved." Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, Minutes of Committee Meeting 
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question on general principles [even] when they [acknowledge 
that they] have forgotten the knowledge necessary for technical 
reasoning."18 
Perhaps, however, Congress should stay its hand because, 
although the rulemakers have no shared sense of the 
limitations on their power, in Professor Marcus' words, they 
approach innovations with "neutrality and care."19 Is that how 
anyone else would describe the process that yielded the two 
most notorious Rules in the last decade, Rule 11 as amended 
in 1983 and Rule 26 as amended in 1993? 
First, as to care, amended Rule 11 was promulgated in a 
virtual empirical vacuum,20 but with numerous warnings from 
the bar about its potential costs.21 I applaud the rulemakers' 
willingness to consider and propose additional amendments 
and to seek empirical evidence in the process, but they did not 
exactly volunteer.22 Moreover, this irresponsible experiment 
with court access23 was in place for ten years. 
1 (February 21, 1992) [hereinafter February 1992 Minutes). Appendix H to the 
Judicial Conference Rules materials for September 1992 is a document entitled 
Proposed Rules Amendments Generating Substantial Controversy. 
18 See HOLMES, supra note 1, at 64. 
Never having specialized in trial practice, I began at the level of 
expertise (and of acquiescence in others' proposals) with which Justice 
Douglas ended. Both categories of revision on which I remark today, 
however, seem to me not matters of expert detail, but rise to the level of 
principle and purpose that even Justice Douglas in his later years 
continued to address. 
H.R. Doc. No. 74, supra note 6, at 110, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 587. 
19 Marcus, supra note 5, at 805. 
20 See Burbank, supra note 4, at 1927-28. 
21 See id. at 1955. 
22Rule 11 was discussed again. It was noted that the anger level in the 
bar is high. It was again noted that the criticism is impressionistic. It 
was also observed that the furor is different than that bearing on Rule 
23 in 1966 with respect to the number and identity of persons involved. 
It was also urged that the Committee should strive to be sufficiently 
receptive to the concerns of others that people will not generally think it 
necessary or desirable to go to Congress for help. 
Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, Committee Minutes 53-54 (April 27-29, 
1989). 
23 "Theory is an irresponsible basis for lawmaking about something as 
important as access to court, and it is especially irresponsible when the lawmaking 
involves judicial amendment of a Rule that, in part because of access concerns, 
only barely escaped the bright light of the democratic process." Burbank, supra 
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And what of the provisions for "required disclosures" in 
the 1993 amendments to Rule 26?24 Do they demonstrate the 
Advisory Committee's "care?'' Again, there was little relevant 
empirical evidence25 and, indeed, the Committee repeatedly 
rejected pleas to stay its hand pending the evaluation of 
experience under local rules.26 Having once abandoned 
ship/7 the Committee was apparently persuaded to reboard 
by the view that it "had a duty to provide leadership in light of 
its study and hearings,"28 by expressed doubt that ongoing 
experimentation would yield any useful empirical data29 and 
by the argument that a national rule would be necessary to 
effect "the cultural change the Committee sought."30 What the 
24 See H.R. Doc. No. 74, supra note 6, at 28, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) 
at 680. 
25 The Advisory Committee Note states: 
The rule is based upon the experience of district courts that have 
required disclosure of some of this information through local rules, court­
approved standard interrogatories, and standing orders . While far 
more limited, the experience of the few state and federal courts that 
have required pre-discovery exchange of core information . . indicates 
that savings in time and expense can be achieved 
H.R. Doc. No. 74, supra note 6, at 94, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 702. 
Yet, the information considered by the Committee was essentially anecdotal, 
and it was not extensive. See, e. g., Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, 
Minutes of the Committee Meeting 5, 8 (November 17-18, 1989); Advisory 
Committee on the Civil Rules, Minutes of the Committee Meeting 2 (Nov. 29-Dec. 
1, 1990); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery 
and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 810-20, 821 (1991). 
26 See Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, Minutes of the Committee 
Meeting 1 (May 22-24, 1991); April 1992 Minutes, supra note 16, at 7; Mullenix, 
supra note 25, at 816-17 n.114; Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for 
Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 458-59 (1993); see also 
infra note 30. 
27 See February 1992 Minutes, supra note 17, at 4. 
28 April 1992 Minutes, supra note 16, at 7. 
29 See id. 
30 !d. The Committee agreed, however, that "the national plan [should] be 
subject to local variation." !d. Thus, amended Rule 26(a)(1) begins: "Except to the 
extent otherwise stipulated or directed by order or local rule, a party shall, 
without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties . ." H.R. Doc. 
No. 74, supra note 6, at 203, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 680. Professor 
Stempel asserts that this feature of Rule 26(a)(1) "reduc[es] the force of th[e] 
objection," made by Justice Scalia, that "[a]ny major reform of the discovery rules 
should await completion of the pilot programs authorized by Congress." H.R. Doc. 
No. 74, supra note 6, at 109, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 586. Yet, local 
variation under the Rule requires that "a court act[ ] affirmatively to impose other 
requirements or indeed to reject all such requirements for the present," H.R. Doc. 
NO. 74, supra note 6, at 226, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 702, and the 
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Committee's "study" involved, other than thought experiments 
by judges and law professors and consideration of some 
anecdotal experiences,31 and what light the hearings shed to 
dispel the massive opposition of the practicing bar32 are not 
clear. Moreover, one would have thought both that care in 
drafting should produce an easily comprehensible rule and that 
a vehicle of cultural change should not be riddled with escape 
hatches.33 
Second, as to neutrality, Professor Marcus and I are in 
substantial agreement, which is to say that from my 
perspective he is dealing with a number of straw men (and 
women). We both know the difference between the inevitable 
non-neutrality of procedure and the notion that the rulemakers 
are or might as well be animated by an overtly political 
agenda.34 We also know that no responsible scholar who has 
seriously considered the issue of non-trans-substantive 
procedure proposes a revolutionary reform. The impact of the 
critique is, indeed, "relatively modest."35 I agree with Professor 
Marcus-indeed, I have been at pains to point oue6-that " [i]t 
does not reject the general idea of a common model of 
procedures for most or all cases, but only asks that special 
circumstances be noted."37 
Committee has provided little guidance for the exercise of the discretion conferred. 
Neither that aspect nor the ability of the parties to stipulate out of Rule 26(a)(1) 
bodes well for controlled experimentation. See Rhonda McMillon, ABA Seeks Delay 
in Amending Federal Discovery Rules, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 119. 
31 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. "Lawyers, including judges and 
law professors, have been lazy about subjecting their hunches-which in honesty 
we should admit are often little better than prejudices-to systematic empirical 
testing." Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
366, 367 (1986),. 
32 See Marcus, supra note 5, at 810. 
33 See A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case Management: The Challenge of 
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. (forthcoming 1993); see 
also McMillon, supra note 30, at 119 (quoting report recommending ABA policy 
that predicts adverse impact on CJRA experimentation process "as litigants and 
courts struggle with the meaning and impact of the new national rules"). 
34 See, e. g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
1463, 1472-73 (1987) (book review). 
35 Marcus, supra note 5, at 778. 
36 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 4, at 1940; Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and 
Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 693, 716-17 & n.172 (1988) 
37 Marcus, supra note 5, at 778. 
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Here, I think, is the rub. For although Professor Marcus 
appears to agree that it makes sense to consider "the likely 
effects of a change, including possible gains and losses for 
identifiable groups,"38 and for a judgment to be made "whether 
some adjustment in the general procedural regime should be 
undertaken to ameliorate the impact on a particular area,"39 
he does not tell us who should make that judgment and, if it is 
the rulemakers, how they can possibly retain their neutrality. 
Indeed, Professor Marcus' discussion of the "risks and costs"40 
of substance-specific procedure demonstrates one reason why 
the rulemakers so rarely seek facts bearing on the impact of 
their proposals and why Professor Carrington advocated a "veil 
of ignorance"41 in rulemaking.42 
If neutrality is not to be a prescription for ignorance, the 
rulemakers must have other sources of information about the 
likely impact of proposed Federal Rules or amendments that 
will serve as a surrogate for empirical work. Three possibilities 
come to mind: the collective experience and wisdom of the 
rulemakers, information provided through written comments 
and public hearings and the fruits of scholarly inquiry. It 
seems to me that the rulemakers' own knowledge base has 
been shrinking, or should I say narrowing, that their professed 
distaste for politics and unwillingness to share power have 
consequentially diminished the utility of public comment and 
that the nature of scholarship in the aid of legal reform has 
changed depressingly little since the days when Charles Clark 
was rewriting the Enabling Act as a scholar to suit his 
purposes as a rulemaker.43 
Professor Marcus is correct that the original Federal Rules 
were drafted "by a group of elite lawyers and law professors 
who acted with little empirical evidence."44 They were, 
however, people of substantial practical experience45 concerned 
38 Id. at 775. 
39 Id. 
40 ld. at 779. 
41 Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded 
Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2079 (1989). 
42 See Burbank, supra note 4, at 1934-41. 
43 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1136-37, 1186. 
44 Marcus, supra note 5, at 782. 
45 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal 
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about rules that would work for lawyers and their clients while 
serving what Professor Garth calls "the universal principles of 
the profession."46 That seems to be the view Justice White 
takes of the current rulemaking group or at least so one might 
infer from his professed reluctance, as one long away from trial 
practice "to second-guess the careful work of the active 
professionals manning the rulemaking committees."47 Active 
at what profession and serving whose interests?48 Does 
neutrality include the willingness to subordinate the interests 
of the judiciary narrowly viewed when they are in conflict with 
other interests traditionally valued, including by the organized 
bar?49 Is that the lesson of Rule 11, of sanctions in general, of 
court-annexed arbitration or of managerial judging?50 
Although drafts of the original Federal Rules were 
distributed for comment,51 in recent years the rulemaking 
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 971-72 
(1987). 
46 Bryant G. Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at 
War with the Profession and its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 959 (1993) 
(identifying "the traditional legal values asserted by the organizations of the legal 
profession-access, judicial independence, official public courts"). 
''7 H.R. Doc No. 74, supra note 6, at 101, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 
575. 
48 See Laura Kaster & Kenneth Wittenberg, Rulemakers Should Be Litigators, 
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at 15 (noting small number of practicing lawyers on 
Advisory Committee). 
49 See Burbank, supra note 34, at 1476-83; cf. Burbank, supra note 3, at 1191 
("But there is reason to fear that if the rulemakers are left to make choices in 
such areas [between procedure and substance], and whatever the purpose of the 
dichotomy, they will choose to advance those policies that are their special 
province and to subordinate those that are not."). Of course, I agree with Professor 
Walker that "federal courts are operated for the benefit of the parties and society 
as a whole, not for the benefit of attorneys." Walker, supra note 26, at 478. 
50 See Burbank, supra note 34, at 1476-87. On managerial judging, see also 
Marcus, supra note 5, at 790-94. 
51 The original Advisory Committee 
produced two preliminary drafts, one m 1936 and one in 1937. 
Thousands of copies were printed. Everybody in the country had an 
opportunity to examine them. At the suggestion of the Attorney General, 
the Federal judges throughout the country appointed local committees of 
the bar, which have worked on this problem. Thousands of suggestions 
came to the advisory committee as a result of these two drafts. 
Hearing on S.J. Res. 281 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3-4 (1938). But see Jeffrey W. Stempel, New 
Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory 
Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 667 (1993) (asserting 








1993] A CALL FOR A MORATORIUM 849 
process has come to resemble the legislative process.52 
Professor Stempel believes that greater assimilation is called 
for.53 I am not so sure. 
The legislative process is, after all, an overtly political 
process, and a visible participant in a political process may, as 
Professor Chayes suggested of judges involved in public law 
litigation, find it difficult to sustain her disinterestedness.54 
The rulemakers' current strategies of burying their heads, 
dismissing arguments with which they disagree as special 
pleading or leaving it for Congress to second-guess them if it 
chooses to do so on "political" grounds55 are hardly 
satisfactory. Yet, just as empirical data have been an effective 
antidote to crisis rhetoric in recent years-as Professor Marcus 
points out56-so could they provide a neutral counter to special 
pleading in the future. Moreover, perhaps we should not give 
up on the profession's ability to reassert the primacy of 
"universal principles"57 over narrow practice interests. In any 
event, the more we fashion the rulemaking process in 
Congress' image, the more Congress will be tempted to second-
developed code of civil procedure"). 
52 See 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1988); Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 
11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997, 998-99 n.3 (1983); Mullenix, supra note 25, at 830-34. 
53 See Stempel supra note 51, at 762. He also advocates more involvement by 
the Supreme Court. Id. at That is hardly the Court's present inclination. See 
supra text accompanying notes 6-9. Moreover, I am doubtful that the Justices have 
either the time or expertise to make a useful contribution, and I fear that, except 
when they are agnostic about a proposal, see supra text accompanying note 7, a 
congressional veto entails some cost to the institution. 
5"' "Can the disinterestedness of the judge be sustained, for example, when he 
is more visibly a part of the political process? Will the consciously negotiated 
character of the relief ultimately erode the sense that what is being applied is 
law?" Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1281, 1309 (1976). 
55 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for 
International Civil Litigation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 1994). For 
a recent example of some of these techniques from a member of the Advisory 
Committee, see Ralph K. Winter, Foreword: In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 
BROOK. L. REV. 263 (1992). 
56 See Marcus, supra note 5, at 762. Civil justice issues involve value 
choices-and that means political choices. But an enhanced knowledge base can 
rescue us from a debate dominated by bogus questions and fictional facts." Marc 
Galanter, News From Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENY. U. 
L. REV. 77, 102 (1993). 
57 See supra text accompanying note 46. 
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guess the product of that process or to preempt it.58 In other �l�,· words, I agree with Professor Marcus that "neutrality is at 
least a pursuable goal in designing procedures for civil j litigation."59 The trick is to be candid in identifying policy ' 
choices and clear about the allocation of power to make 
them.60 
As one whose work is cited twice in uncomfortably close 
proximity to Professor Marcus' characterizations of criticisms 
or commentary as "heated,"61 I should probably have better 
sense than to dilate on the impoverishment of current 
procedural scholarship. It is not a new story,62 which may be 
answer enough to Professor Stempel's attempt to use civil 
procedure textbooks as evidence of the vibrancy of the old 
paradigm.63 Another look at those textbooks, however, should 
suffice to drive from his mind the curious notion, at least as 
applied to procedure, that "constitutional rights of federalism, 
historically . . . have not been given the same force as 
separation of powers principles."64 If that were true, Sibbach 
v. Wilson & Co. 65 and Hanna v. Plumer66 might have come 
out the other way and we might not be here today.67 
From this perspective, the teeth gnashing and general 
hysteria that have greeted the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 
("CJRA")68 in some quarters are mystifying if not downright 
funny. What is a member of Congress who hears that "[t]he 
reigning sensibility for fifty years of federal rulemaking has 
been an ethos of elitism and secrecy"69 to make of the charge 
that the CJRA was "stealth legislation"?70 If that same 
58 Accord Walker, supra note 26, at 463. 
59 Marcus, supra note 5, at 773. 
60 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 34, at 1473. 
61 See Marcus, supra note 5, at 776. 
62 See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., RESEARCH lN CIVIL PROCEDURE (1963). 
63 See Stempel, supra note 51, at 688. 
64 Id. at 415. 
65 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
66 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
67 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 3, at 1028-35, 1187. 
68 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (Supp. III 1991). 
69 Mullenix, supra note 25, at 837. But see supra note 51 and accompanying 
text (noting wide distribution of drafts of original Federal Rules). 
70 Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. 
L. REV. 375, 397 (1992). The charge is, in any event, silly. See Jeffrey J. Peck, 
"Users United:" The Ciuil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
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legislator knows something about the present composition of 
the rules committees,71 how should she react to criticisms of 
the Brookings Task Force,72 and why in any event should she 
care since it did not enact anything?73 Should she be moved 
by criticisms that the legislation is founded on a questionable 
empirical base74 if she knows the history of the 1993 
amendments to Rule 26?75 Should she be moved by criticisms 
that it will "transform the reigning procedural aesthetic of 
simplicity and uniformity"76 if she knows that, as a result of a 
vast underbrush of local rules and standing orders, the 
supposed aesthetic has nothing to do with reality?77 And what 
about the claim that the statute violates the separation of 
powers?78 Is it Sibbach or Hanna that so exalts the allocation 
of lawmaking power between the branches?79 
105, 109, 116-17 (1991). 
71 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
72 See Mullenix, supra note 70, at 406-07. 
73 The same question might be asked about the advisory groups created under 
the Act. See Levin, supra note 33; Stempel, supra note 51, at 733 ("A frequent 
complaint voiced by practitioners serving on Advisory Groups is the 
unreceptiveness of the bench to their ideas."). But see Linda S. Mullenix, 
Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Ciuil Justice Reform Act and Separation of 
Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1298 (1993) ("In delegating rulemaking power to 
civilian, non-expert advisory groups, and in statutorily requiring that these 
advisory groups consider and implement certain types of procedural reforms, 
Congress engaged in procedural rulemaking."). More astonishing than this 
assertion is Professor Mullenix's conclusion that Congress "violate[d] separation-of­
power doctrine by impermissibly infringing on the power, prerogatives, and 
independence of the federal courts to promulgate procedural rules." Id. For a more 
sober judgment, see LAUREN K. ROBEL, FRACTURED PROCEDURE: THE CIVIL JUSTICE 
REFORM ACT OF 1990 (forthcoming). See also infra text accompanying note 79. 
7' See Mullenix, supra note 70, at 396-97 & n.90; Avern Cohn, A Judge's View 
of Congressional Action Affecting the Courts, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 101 
(1991). Again, the same question might be asked about the work of advisory 
groups under the Act. But see Mullenix, supra note 73, at 1287 ("under the Act, 
grassroots, amateur local rulemaking groups will recommend problematic local 
rules, measures, and programs based not on considered contemplative study, but 
rather on ill-conceived social science, anecdote, and interest-group lobbying."). 
75 See supra text accompanying notes 24-33. 
76 Mullenix, supra note 73, at 1287. 
77 See Burbank, supra note 4, at 1929, 1941. Professor Mullenix admits that 
"[t]oday, federal practice and procedure is impossibly arcane." Mullenix, supra note 
70, at 380. 
78 See generally Mullenix, supra note 73. 
79 "Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of 
federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or other federal 
courts authority to make rules." Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 9 (1941) 
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Please do not misapprehend. I am no fan of the CJRA or of 
the process by which it was passed. In fact, I have found it 
very difficult to read, let alone to take seriously. Professor 
Robel's paper suggests that I have been on the right track,80 
although some of the questionable local rules promulgated 
under the CJRA's supposed authority, which she analyzes in 
another paper, should be taken very seriously.81 
Senator Eiden is not a captive of the insurance industry82 
any more than he is the son of a Welsh coal miner.83 He is a 
politician who wanted a statute on civil justice reform. After 
some nervous moments, the end product was quite innocuous. 
Against a background of the rulemaker's inattention to the 
allocation of lawmaking power and to empirical evidence, many 
criticisms of the CJRA from that quarter have the odor of sour 
grapes.84 Moreover, to the extent that the Act as finally 
passed is seen as an attempt to fill an empirical vacuum or an 
(footnote omitted). "For the constitutional provision for a federal court system 
(augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional 
power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts." Hanna 
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). Professor Mullenix's attempt to deal with 
these cases is based on a fundamentally flawed view of the Rules Enabling Act 
and its antecedent history. See Mullenix, supra note 73, at 1327-29. 
Indeed, the most astonishing aspect of her assault on the Civil Justice Reform 
Act is the attempt to enlist the Rules Enabling Act in aid of her constitutional 
thesis. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 73, at 1321-37. Senator Walsh, who 
prevented passage of the legislation from 1915 until 1934, must be spinning in his 
grave. See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1063-98. More important, the main sponsor 
of the legislation, Senator Cummins, would be shocked. "It is probably true that, 
in the absence of any legislation, courts have the inherent right to make rules for 
the government of the matters mentioned in the bill: but this is purely an 
academic question because the Congress has legislated upon the subject, 
withdrawing that power, insofar as the district courts are concerned." 8. REP. No. 
1174, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1926); see also id. at 7-9. On Cummins and the 
importance of the 1926 Senate Report to the interpretation of the Enabling Act, 
see Burbank, supra note 3, at 1071-92, 1098-1101; Peck, supra note 70, at 115. 
Finally, all of us (including Professor Mullenix) should remember that the 
Enabling Act was revised in 1988. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
80 See Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the 
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 879 (1993). 
81 See, e.g., ROBEL, supra note 73. 
82 See Marcus, supra note 5, at 804. But see Cohn, supra note 74, at 103 ("it 
appears that, given the financing of Justice for Ali, the precursor of the Eiden 
Bill, the bill is being driven by special interests."). 
83 See William Satire, On Language: No Heavy Lifting, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 
1987, § 6, at 12. 
84 Cf. Robel, supra note 80, at 883 n.22 (quoting federal judge's remark, "Being 
told you're inefficient by Congress is like being told you're ugly by a toad."). 
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expression of distrust in the rulemaking process,85 Justice 
Scalia's dissent can only flag the 1993 amendments to Rule 26 
as salt in Senator Eiden's wounds.86 
I am not sure that I agree with Professor Stempel's 
prediction that "the judicial branch and the legal profession at 
large will regain some of the ground lost."87 I am doubtful 
because practicing lawyers play such a small role in 
decisionmaking about the Federal Rules,88 and also because, 
as Professor Garth suggests, it may no longer make sense to 
talk about the legal profession in connection with procedural 
reform.89 Indeed, it may be that the winners in the reforms of 
the last decade have been the judiciary and some lawyers (and 
their clients). If so, however, the lesson is not that neutrality 
and generality are progressive or at least benignly 
unpredictable, as Professor Marcus, taking a cue from 
Professor Hazard,90 would have it.91 
Whatever the motivations of the original Advisory 
Committee,92 the procedural system that group produced was 
a bonanza for lawyers-lawyers, it is important to note, of all 
types. A system of open access to the courts is a lawyer­
friendly system,93 one that permits lawyers, or at least those 
who subordinate their clients' interests, not to worry about 
what Professor Garth calls "the tension-or even 
contradiction-between the legal profession and legal 
practice."94 And whatever accounts for the pressure to shrink 
the litigation pie in recent years, the prospect has meant both 
that it was more difficult for lawyers to subordinate their 
clients' interests and that some lawyers (and their clients) 
would lose. The choices about who wins and who loses typically 
are not made in Federal Rules; they are made by judges 
85 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 5, at 852-53; Peck, supra note 70, at 113-16. 
86 See H.R. Doc. No. 74, supra note 6, at 108-09, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. 
(Preface) at 584-86; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
87 Stempel, supra note 51, at 735. 
88 See supra text accompanying notes 44-50. 
89 See generally  Garth, supra note 46. 
90 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2247 (1989). 
91 See Marcus, supra note 5, at 773, 775, 785. 
92 See id. at 765. 
93 See generally Garth, supra note 46. 
" Id. at 931. 
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exercising the vast discretion that a system of general rules of 
procedure reposes in them.95 Remember that Charles Clark 
and William Howard Taft were dancing cheek-to-cheek.96 
Divisions among lawyer entrepreneurs on questions 
relating to open access bode ill for the ability of the "organized 
bar"97 to have consequential impact on civil justice reform, 
wherever the focus of the reform effort. Worse, experience 
under the CJRA suggests that, unless local experimentation is 
tightly controlled, "various sections of the organized bar" may 
collaborate with the federal judges who appoint them in what 
Professor Robel calls the "destructi[on] of important procedural 
values."98 
These phenomena-the growing impotence of the 
organized bar, the increase in the number of difficult choices 
federal judges must make in the exercise of their discretion 
under the national rules and the temptation to make such 
choices in local rules-are hardly a firm basis on which to 
predict that Congress will, let alone to believe that it should, 
leave the field. 
Some years ago I half-facetiously asked whether, given the 
assimilation of the rulemaking process to the legislative 
process and the pace of proposed amendments, there is "reason 
to fear that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will become a 
latter day Throop Code."99 There would be nothing facetious 
about such a question today, particularly with Justice Scalia 
parting his veil of ignorance to assert that "[c]onstant reform of 
the federal rules to correct emerging problems is essential."100 
The "continuous study of the operation and effect"101 of 
Federal Rules required by statute need not be, and it should 
not be, construed as an invitation to "[c]onstant reform." It is 
95 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 34, at 1473-76. 
96 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Chancellor's Boot, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 31, 33-34 
(1988). 
97 Garth, supra, note 46, at 932. 
98 ROBEL, supra note 73. 
99 Burbank, supra note 52, at 999 n.3. "This Code . . was attacked by bar 
committees for intermingling substantive and procedural provisions, and for being 
too long, too complicated, 'too minute and technical, and lack[ing] elasticity and 
adaptability."' Subrin, supra note 45, at 940 (footnote omitted). 
100 H.R. Doc. No. 74, supra note 6, at 109-110, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) 
at 586-87. 
101 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988). 
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time for a breather, for a group that includes rulemakers, 
members of Congress and members of the bar carefully to 
review where we have been, where we are going and where we 
should be going.102 It is time for a moratorium on ignorance 
and procedural law reform. 
102 The study group I have in mind, which might take the form of a national 
commission, should consider the interesting proposal recently made by Professor 
Walker, among others. See generally Walker, supra note 26. 
